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LET THE JURY DO THE WAIVE
INTRODUCTION
Beginning at the turn of the twentieth century, the states
challenged the age-old conventions of youth and culpability by
creating juvenile court systems.' The systems had been designed as
a substitute for the discipline juveniles traditionally received from
their parents: it mandated informality and individualized treat-
ment, and emphasized rehabilitating young offenders rather than
punishing them.2 Despite these ideals, or perhaps because of them,
the systems fell short of the mark as American society continued to
change during the twentieth century. The supposed benefit of
juvenile court adjudications-a lack of formality-increasingly
became a burden, as juvenile court judges wielded nearly absolute
discretion in the absence of any due process standards.3
Approximately sixty-five years after the first juvenile court was
established, the U.S. Supreme Court held that certain due process
rights must be afforded to juvenile offenders.4 The Court was
unwilling, however, to entirely disregard the "unique" nature5 of
juvenile court proceedings. In McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, it held
that the right to a jury trial "is not a constitutional requirement" for
juvenile proceedings.' McKeiver never has been overruled, despite
widespread criticism of the plurality opinion.7
The unique nature of juvenile proceedings has also led to a
practice the framers of the juvenile court system never contem-
plated: modern jurisdictions have allowed juveniles to be tried as
adults. The process of sending an individual from juvenile court to
"adult" criminal court, which hereinafter will be referred to as
juvenile "waiver" or "transfer," reflects the contemporary societal
1. See Mary Berkheiser, The Fiction of Juvenile Right to Counsel: Waiver in the Juvenile
Courts, 54 FLA. L. REV. 577, 585-86 (2002).
2. See infra notes 21-26 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 27-28, 31-33 and accompanying text. The U.S. Constitution provides
that "[n]o State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
4. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1967).
5. Id. at 22.
6. 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971) (plurality opinion).
7. See, e.g., infra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
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belief that some children simply cannot benefit from the rehabilita-
tive nature of juvenile courts.8 For this reason, all states and the
District of Columbia have established by statute at least one
method for determining which juveniles should be tried in criminal
court.9
Compared with criminal court proceedings, and even with
juvenile adjudications, transfer proceedings provide the fewest
procedural protections for juveniles.'0 An unfavorable result in the
transfer proceeding potentially could send an individual away from
juvenile court, where he at worst would receive a relatively lenient
disposition, to a criminal court, where he could receive a significant
sentence for the same offense. The standard for demonstrating the
requisite findings for transfer, however, is not difficult to meet."
The Supreme Court has held that juvenile transfer proceedings are
constitutionally permissible as long as they are completed before
any adjudication of the offense 2 and meet basic due process
standards. 3 However, it has never found the right to a jury to be a
prerequisite.
Apprendi v. New Jersey4 reflected the Court's dramatic change
in perception concerning the jury's role in criminal proceedings. In
Apprendi, the Court held that, "roh er than the fact of a prior
conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond
the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and
proved beyond a reasonable doubt."' 5 With this holding, the Court
specifically addressed the relative "novelty" of sentencing guidelines
in criminal proceedings.' 6 The actual scope of Apprendi, however,
continues to be explored.
With its broad holding, Apprendi and its jury requirement could
apply to juvenile transfer proceedings. A number of state and
8. See Barry C. Feld, Essay, The Transformation of the Juvenile Court, 75 MINN. L. REV.
691, 701 (1991).
9. For a discussion of the various methods of juvenile transfer, see infra Part II.B.
10. See infra Part II.B for an examination of the various juvenile transfer statutes and
their effects.
11. See infra Part II.B.
12. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 535-36 (1975).
13. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 553 (1966).
14. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
15. Id. at 490.
16. See id. at 482-83.
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federal courts have examined this possibility, though the Supreme
Court has not yet decided to rule on the issue. This Note will
analyze Apprendi's applicability to juvenile transfer proceedings
throughout the United States. Part I will review the establishment
and early history of the juvenile court system, examine the
Supreme Court opinions that tempered the system's abuses with
certain procedural standards, and contrast those opinions with
McKeiver, which actually denied a procedural right in juvenile
adjudications. Part II will discuss the cases providing the frame-
work for juvenile transfer proceedings, and then identify the types
of transfer statutes since ratified.
Part III will explore the 2000 Apprendi decision. It will probe the
opinion's meaning and briefly review subsequent cases interpreting
its holding. Finally, it will analyze recent state and federal cases
discussing Apprendi's application to juvenile transfer proceedings.
After evaluating the rationale of these cases, this Note will conclude
in Part IV that due process and the recently enhanced perception
of the jury as fact-finder mandate that Apprendi's jury require-
ment apply, to a certain extent, to juvenile transfer proceedings. It
will discuss how the requirement may be met without seriously
disrupting the juvenile transfer process or destroying the ideals of
juvenile courts that the Supreme Court has always attempted to
preserve.
I. DEFINING THE JUVENILE COURT SYSTEM
A. Purpose and Progress
Juvenile justice has evolved dramatically over the past 150 years
of American jurisprudence. Up until the late nineteenth century,
American courts had followed the overly broad precedent set by
English common law.'7 Children who were denied the excuse of
17. See Chauncey E. Brummer, Extended Juvenile Jurisdiction: The Best of Both
Worlds?, 54 ARK. L. REv. 777, 779-80 (2002). The English and early American courts divided
children into three groups. Those under the age of seven could not be found criminally
responsible for any action. Id. Conversely, a child over the age of fourteen was deemed fully
responsible for his actions and thus would be tried the same as an adult. See id. at 780. A
child between the ages of seven and fourteen was presumed to lack the capacity for criminal
acts, but the State could rebut this presumption. See id. Some jurisdictions still recognize
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youth automatically were tried in the same criminal court as
adults; "there was no separate system of juvenile justice."'8
The nineteenth century marked America's transformation
from a largely agrarian to a modern, industrial society.19 With
urbanization and immigration arose related social problems; the
Progressive movement arose to counter these problems.2 ° One group
of Progressives took as their cause the reformation of the juvenile
justice system.2' In emphasizing individualized rehabilitation of
offenders over mere punishment of crimes, they embraced a
positivist view of criminology.22 They believed that children, in
particular, were "vulnerable, fragile, and dependent innocents" in
need of protection and understanding.23
The Progressives succeeded by the end of the nineteenth century
in isolating juveniles from the traditional criminal justice system
altogether.24 They introduced "professional" juvenile court workers
who supervised and treated children based on individual needs.25
A juvenile court proceeding ideally would consist of "a fatherly
judge [who] touched the heart and conscience of the erring youth
by talking over his problems, [and] by paternal advice and admoni-
tion."26 In reality, "[tihe juvenile court was free to apply whatever
this categorical concept as the "Rule of Sevens." See, e.g., Cardwell v. Bechtol, 724 S.W.2d
739, 744-45 (Tenn. 1987).
18. Donald L. Beschle, The Juvenile Justice Counterrevolution: Responding to Cognitive
Dissonance in the Law's View of the Decision-making Capacity of Minors, 48 EMoRY L.J. 65,
69 (1999).
19. Feld, supra note 8, at 693.
20. Id.
21. See Berkheiser, supra note 1, at 583. This group was aptly named the "child savers."
Id.
22. See Barry C. Feld, The Constitutional Tension Between Apprendi and McKeiver:
Sentence Enhancements Based on Delinquency Convictions and the Quality of Justice in
Juvenile Courts, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1111, 1136-37 (2003). In contrast to the prevailing
view of criminal justice at the time, which focused only on the crime committed, positive
criminology focused on the factors leading to the crime. See id. at 1136. Its proponents
rejected the idea that crime is a function of free will, instead believing that "deterministic
forces" beyond one's control could impair moral judgment. Id. at 1137. Rather than punish
the offender for falling under the influence of these deterministic forces, the Progressives
promoted rehabilitation in order to limit the offender's susceptibility to future moral lapses.
See id.
23. Id. at 1135-36.
24. See id. at 1138.
25. See id.
26. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 25-26 (1967).
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discipline a parent might be free to use, and it was given the same
protections that parents had regarding outside interference. 27
Following the doctrine of parens patriae, the juvenile court system
exercised broad discretion over the lives of children.2 s
Illinois established America's first juvenile court in 1899.29
Within twenty years, all states had established similar courts.3 °
These courts isolated themselves entirely from the traditional
criminal process:
Reformers modified courtroom procedures to eliminate any
implication of a criminal proceeding, adopted a euphemistic
vocabulary, and endorsed a physically separate court building
to avoid the stigma of adult prosecutions. Judges conducted
confidential hearings, limited public access to court records, and
found children to be delinquent rather than guilty of a crime.
Proceedings focused on the child's background and welfare
rather than the specifics of the crime. Reformers envisioned a
social welfare system rather than a judicial one, and they
excluded lawyers, juries, rules of evidence, and formal proce-
dures from delinquency proceedings.31
Sentencing practices also were open-ended, left almost entirely to
the judge's discretion.32 Indeed, the early juvenile courts had very
27. Brummer, supra note 17, at 784; see also Berkheiser, supra note 1, at 649 ("The broad
discretion granted to juvenile court judges by the court's founders and later by state statutes,
coupled with the informality ofjuvenile court proceedings, have impeded the full recognition
of juveniles' constitutional rights.").
28. See Brummer, supra note 17, at 784. "Parenspatriae" is a legal doctrine under which
"the state in its capacity as provider of protection to those unable to care for themselves" may
act on behalf of those individuals. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1144 (8th ed. 2004).
29. See Berkheiser, supra note 1, at 586 & n.44. The enabling Illinois law was entitled
"[a]n Act relating to children who are or may hereafter become dependent, neglected or
delinquent ... and to provide for the treatment, control, maintenance, adoption and
guardianship of the persons of such children." 1899 Ill. Laws 131 (current version at 705 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/1-1 to 7-1 (West 2005)), quoted in People v. Suhling, 1924 WL 3453,
at *2 (Ill. App. Ct. 1924).
30. Lucy S. McGough & Lauren Cangelosi, Lost Causes, 65 LA. L. REV. 1125, 1127-28
(2005).
31. Feld, supra note 22, at 1138-39 (footnotes omitted).
32. See, e.g., Beschle, supra note 18, at 71 ("[T]hese courts were empowered to act in a
way that combined the perceived advantages of procedural informality and individualized
tailoring of remedies."). These tailored sentences typically would last only until the juvenile
offender became an adult, at which point the offender's record would be expunged, 'leaving
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little in common with the "adult" criminal courts, to the point that
juvenile proceedings were labeled as mere civil dispositions instead
of criminal trials.33 Because of this lack of legal boundary, oppo-
nents of the Progressive movement began to call for reforms of their
own.
34
B. Challenging the Kangaroo Court
The 1967 decision In re Gault3" reflected the U.S. Supreme
Court's growing impatience with the juvenile court's limitless
discretion. With its holding in this case, the Court "began trans-
forming the juvenile court into a very different institution than
the Progressives contemplated."36 Arizona police had taken the
fifteen-year-old petitioner into custody on the basis of a neighbor's
complaint that he had made a lewd phone call, but they failed to
provide notice of the arrest to petitioner's parents.37 After an
informal preliminary hearing, in which no witnesses were sworn
in, and a second hearing six days later, the judge concluded that
petitioner was a juvenile delinquent, and as such would be sen-
tenced to an Arizona detention center for the remainder of his
minority."5 At no point did the judge advise petitioner or his parents
of the right to counsel.39 The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the
lower court's subsequent dismissal of petitioner's writ of habeas
no permanent criminal stigma." Id.
33. See id.
34. See id. at 71-72.
35. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
36. Feld, supra note 8, at 691; see also The Supreme Court, 1970 Term: Jury Trials in
Juvenile Proceedings, 85 HARv. L. REv. 113, 113-14 (1971) [hereinafter 1970 Term]
(describing Gault, followed by In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), as attempts to reform the
juvenile court system "item-by-item").
37. See Gault, 387 U.S. at 4-5. The parents first learned of petitioner's arrest through the
codefendant's parents. See id. at 5. The superintendent of the detention center where
petitioner was being held filed a formal petition with the court the day after petitioner's
arrest; again, the parents never received notice. See id.
38. See id. at 5-8. At the conclusion of the first hearing, the judge told petitioner only that
"he would 'think about"' his decision on delinquency. Id. at 6. The parents did receive notice
of the second hearing: a brief note on plain paper with no letterhead. See id. At neither of
these hearings was the complaining neighbor present. See id. at 6-7. The judge concluded
that petitioner's alleged confession to making a lewd remark over the phone was sufficient
to establish delinquincy. See id.
39. See id. at 34.
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corpus, which argued that petitioner's basic due process rights had
been violated in the delinquency proceeding.40
Justice Fortas, writing for the majority of the United States
Supreme Court, stated that "neither the Fourteenth Amendment
nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone.""' While noting that "wide
differences have been tolerated-indeed insisted upon-between the
procedural rights accorded to adults and those of juveniles," he
argued that avoidable instances of "unfairness" and "inadequate or
inaccurate findings of fact and unfortunate prescriptions of remedy"
have plagued the juvenile court system.42 In making this assertion,
Justice Fortas dismissed arguments that juveniles already were
protected adequately from procedural shortcomings, and even
benefitted from the isolated and secretive nature of the juvenile
court.43 He offered an alternative to that Progressive standard:
"[T]he appearance as well as the actuality of fairness, impartiality
and orderliness-in short, the essentials of due process-may be a
more impressive and more therapeutic attitude so far as the
juvenile is concerned."" Although agreeing that the concept of "the
kindly juvenile judge" should not be entirely eliminated from the
juvenile court, he made clear that "the condition of being a boy [or
girl] does not justify a kangaroo court."45
The Court established that the fundamental due process owed to
juveniles included providing them and their parents with the
same type of notice adequate for a criminal or civil proceeding.46
Fundamental due process also required the assistance of counsel
at all stages of the proceedings, the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion, and the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses.47 In
applying this "fundamental fairness doctrine," Justice Fortas did
caution that not all due process requirements of a criminal trial
necessarily applied to juvenile proceedings.4"
40. See id. at 9-10.
41. Id. at 13.
42. Id. at 14, 19-20.
43. See id. at 24. Justice Fortas labeled this claim as "more rhetoric than reality." Id.
44. Id. at 26.
45. Id. at 27-28.
46. See id. at 33-34.
47. See id. at 36-37, 38 n.65, 55, 57.
48. Id. at 30; see, e.g., Berkheiser, supra note 1, at 592 ('The fundamental fairness
doctrine permitted the Court to stake out a middle ground that abandoned the former 'worst
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Three years later, the Court added a procedural right to its list
of essentials. Delivering the majority opinion for In re Winship,
Justice Brennan argued that "virtually unanimous adherence to the
reasonable-doubt standard" strongly suggested that it was "as much
required during the adjudicatory stage of a delinquency proceeding
as are those constitutional safeguards applied in Gault."49 He
pointed out that the lofty burden-of-proof standard commanded
the respect of the fact-finder, the juvenile, and the community at
large.5° Petitioner, in particular, had a significant interest in a
reasonable doubt standard "both because of the possibility that he
may lose his liberty upon conviction and because of the certainty
that he would be stigmatized by the conviction."'" Mindful of the
fundamental fairness doctrine, the Court determined that requiring
the reasonable doubt standard would not have a destructive effect
on the informality, flexibility, or other beneficial features of juvenile
court proceedings."
C. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania
The lower courts' early reactions to Gault and Winship were
cautious at best and defiant at worst. Many juvenile court judges
refused to comply fully with the new requirements; some refused to
comply at all.53 Perhaps in consideration of this backlash, the
Supreme Court relented and provided one due process limitation in
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania.54 In this case, decided four years after
Gault and one year after Winship, a plurality of Justices held that
"trial by jury in the juvenile court's adjudicative stage is not a
constitutional requirement."55 The plurality reasoned that "one
of both worlds' juvenile court regime in which children received neither the constitutional
protections afforded adult defendants nor the care and treatment that justified the absence
of those protections.").
49. 397 U.S. 358, 361-63, 368 (1970).
50. See id. at 363-64.
51. Id. at 363.
52. See id. at 366-67.
53. See Berkheiser, supra note 1, at 607-08.
54. 403 U.S. 528 (1971) (plurality opinion).
55. Id. at 545.
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cannot say that in our legal system the jury is a necessary compo-
nent of accurate factfinding. 56
Justice Blackmun, writing for the plurality, listed thirteen
reasons to support this conclusion. 7 These enumerated reasons can
be simplified into six main rationales. First, Gault and Winship
cautioned against adding procedural requirements that would
eliminate the distinction between juvenile and criminal courts.58
Second, a jury requirement potentially could bring with it the delay,
formality, and adversary process an ideal juvenile court would
lack.59 Third, Court dicta and outside reports suggested that a jury
was not necessary to ensure a fair juvenile court process.6 0 Fourth,
the majority of states, as well as federal legislation, did not support
the right to jury trial in juvenile proceedings.6' Fifth, the Court was
not yet willing to abandon the juvenile court system, despite its
clear abuses." Finally, the Court explained that a juvenile court
judge already had the power to use an "advisory jury" whenever he
deemed it necessary. 3
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Douglas rebutted several of
the plurality's reasons. He argued that the presence of "twelve
objective citizens" would impress on the juvenile the gravity of the
event.6 4 Disagreeing with the plurality's presumption that a jury
requirement would backlog the courts, he emphasized that a
juvenile who believed he was treated fairly in the judicial process
would be a better candidate for rehabilitation.65 Rather than accept
56. Id. at 543.
57. See id. at 545-51; cf. Feld, supra note 22, at 1147 (criticizing the McKeiver plurality's
offering of "reasons, rather than reasoning and analysis, to justify its rejection of a jury
right").
58. See McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 545, 550.
59. See id.
60. See id. at 546-47; id. at 551 (White, J., concurring). The Court specifically cited its
recent decision in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 547
(plurality opinion). In incorporating the Sixth Amendment jury guarantee to apply to the
states, the Court in Duncan suggested in a footnote that one could eliminate juries entirely
and still maintain a "fair and equitable" criminal process. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 149 n. 14. But
see McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 557 (Harlan, J., concurring) (arguing that, until juvenile courts are
"restructured to fit their original purpose," Duncan should apply to juvenile adjudications).
61. See McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 548-50 (plurality opinion).
62. See id. at 547-48.
63. Id. at 548.
64. See id. app. at 563-64 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
65. See id. at 565-66.
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the plurality's attempt to balance procedural rights, Justice
Douglas stated that when an individual is adjudicated in juvenile
court and faces "confinement" until the end of minority, "he is
entitled to the same procedural protection as an adult."6
Scholars have long criticized the McKeiver plurality's analysis, if
not its holding.67 Indeed, McKeiver is one of the few Supreme Court
opinions that has applied a fundamental fairness analysis and
restricted procedural liberties in juvenile adjudications.68 To put the
opinion in perspective, perhaps it may be useful to identify two
additional Supreme Court cases that have tackled the challenge of
determining procedural rights in juvenile court.
II. THE MODERN APPROACH OF JUVENILE TRANSFER
A. Setting the Ground Rules for a "Critically Important"
Proceeding
The second half of the twentieth century saw many structural
changes in the juvenile court system, particularly after Gault. The
result that Gault attempted to avoid-a connection between the
juvenile and criminal courts-seemed to become all the more
inevitable with its holding:
In Gault, the Supreme Court engrafted formal trial procedures
onto the juvenile court's individualized treatment sentencing
scheme. Although the Court did not intend to alter the juvenile
court's therapeutic mission, ... legislative, judicial, and adminis-
trative responses to Gault have modified the court's jurisdiction,
purpose, and procedures. As a result, juvenile courts now
66. Id. at 559.
67. See, e.g., 1970 Term, supra note 36, at 116 (agreeing with the plurality's application
of the fundamental fairness analysis, but arguing that the plurality "seriously
underestimated the jury's potential role in assuring fairness in the juvenile process"); Feld,
supra note 22, at 1148-50 (identifying several critical factors, including flexibility, formality,
and "whether delinquents also required procedural protections against government
oppression," that the plurality failed to consider in any great detail).
68. See also Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 268 (1984) (finding that holding juveniles in
detention during pretrial proceedings does not violate fundamental fairness).
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converge procedurally and substantively with adult criminal
courts.6 9
Sentencing practices, in particular, have experienced a "funda-
mental change ... as considerations of the offense, rather than the
offender, [now] dominate the decision. ' 7' Retribution, rather than
rehabilitation, has become the dominant sentencing philosophy.71
Reflecting this shift in philosophy, the states have mandated that
certain juveniles receive true retribution for their actions by being
tried as adults.72 They believed that some children simply could not
benefit from the juvenile court system. Two U.S. Supreme Court
decisions provided constitutional form to these "juvenile transfer"
statutes: Kent v. United States, a pre-Gault decision; and Breed v.
Jones, a post-McKeiver decision.
1. Kent v. United States
The sixteen-year-old petitioner in Kent was arrested for house-
breaking, robbery, and rape.7' The juvenile court judge waived
jurisdiction over petitioner, without a formal hearing or even a
conference with petitioner's counsel or parents.74 In so doing, the
judge relied on the statutory authority of the District of Columbia
Juvenile Court Act, which provided that a "judge may, after full
investigation, waive jurisdiction and order" a criminal trial for any
child sixteen years of age or older who was charged with a felony
offense.75 Petitioner was convicted in criminal court and sentenced
to a minimum of thirty years in prison.76 On appeal to the Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, and eventually to the Supreme Court,
petitioner argued that the juvenile court judge's initial decision to
69. Feld, supra note 8, at 691-92; see also Beschle, supra note 18, at 76 (noting that the
1990s had "seen a clear trend toward, if not abolishing the separate juvenile court system,
at least seriously curtailing its jurisdiction").
70. Feld, supra note 8, at 700.
71. See id. at 701.
72. See infra Part II.B. for a detailed overview of these statutory mandates.
73. See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 543-44 (1966).
74. See id. at 546-48. The juvenile court judge also refused to rule on motions by
petitioner's counsel to provide access to the psychological and Social Service reports he
presumably considered in his decision to waive. See id. at 546.
75. Id. at 547-48 (emphasis added) (quoting D.C. CODE § 11-914 (1961)).
76. See id. at 550.
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waive jurisdiction amounted to an "infirmity of the proceedings"
that should not stand."
The Supreme Court agreed that the waiver decision was invalid.
Writing for the majority, Justice Fortas stated that juvenile court
judges should enjoy only the level of latitude that "assumes pro-
cedural regularity sufficient in the particular circumstances to
satisfy the basic requirements of due process and fairness, as well
as compliance with the statutory requirement of a 'full investiga-
tion.' 78 To satisfy these requirements, Justice Fortas continued,
petitioner must be provided a hearing, at which he would have
access to all records and reports that the judge may consider. 79 If
the judge should decide to order a waiver, he must state the reasons
for his decision.8 °
In entering this holding, the Court did not require that waiver
hearings "conform with all of the requirements of a criminal trial,"
but only with the "essentials of due process and fair treatment.""
However, it was not swayed by the traditional arguments for a
separate juvenile court system, namely, theparens patriae doctrine
and the "civil" label typically afforded to juvenile proceedings.8
Indeed, it made very clear in Kent that juvenile transfer is "a
'critically important' proceeding."83
2. Breed v. Jones
Nine years after Kent, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the critical
importance of juvenile transfer hearings in Breed v. Jones.4 The
77. Id. at 552.
78. Id. at 552-53 (quoting Green v. United States, 308 F.2d 303 (D.C. Cir. 1962)). With
this statement, Justice Fortas established the framework for the fundamental fairness
doctrine he would develop fully one year later in Gault. See supra notes 41-48 and
accompanying text.
79. Kent, 383 U.S. at 557.
80. See id. at 557, 561.
81. Id. at 562.
82. See id. at 554-56; supra notes 27-28, 33 and accompanying text. Rather, Justice
Fortas argued,"there may be grounds for concern that the child receives the worst of both
worlds: that he gets neither the protections accorded to adults nor the solicitous care and
regenerative treatment postulated for children." Kent, 383 U.S. at 556.
83. Id. at 560.
84. 421 U.S. 519 (1975).
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respondent in Breed allegedly had committed armed robbery. 85
Following a hearing in which respondent and two witnesses
testified, the juvenile court judge determined by a preponderance
of the evidence that the allegations against respondent were
accurate.86 In a subsequent hearing, the judge also determined that
respondent was "not ... amenable to the care, treatment and
training program available through the facilities of the juvenile
court," and ordered that he be tried as an adult.8 " Respondent
underwent a trial and was found guilty of first-degree robbery.88
The Supreme Court unanimously held that respondent's
adjudicatory hearing, when followed by his criminal trial, violated
the Double Jeopardy Clause.8" Writing for the Court, Chief Justice
Burger noted at the start that "jeopardy of life or limb" traditionally
had been associated only with criminal prosecution.9" He concluded,
nevertheless, that an individual who experiences a juvenile
adjudication, the result of which could cast social stigma on him
and deprive him of his liberty, has been put in jeopardy of life or
limb.91 The possibility of transfer to criminal court, certainly, "is a
matter of great significance to the juvenile."92 Essentially, the Court
believed that the juvenile in this case had experienced two "trials,"
and all the burdens inherent in each, for the single charge of first-
degree robbery.
Directly addressing the decision in McKeiver, Chief Justice
Burger distinguished Breed as merely analyzing the risk inherent
in a juvenile adjudication rather than addressing a formality of
the criminal process.93 Applying the double jeopardy standard, he
argued, would not destroy the unique nature of juvenile courts
85. Id. at 521.
86. See id. at 521-22. The juvenile court judge acted under the authority of section 701
of the California Welfare and Institutions Code (current version at CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE
§ 701 (Deering 2005)). See id. at 521 & n.3.
87. Id. at 523-24 (internal quotation marks omitted). Here the judge applied section 707
of the California Welfare and Institutions Code (current version at CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE
§ 707 (Deering 2005)). See id. at 523.
88. Id. at 525.
89. Id. at 541. The Double Jeopardy Clause provides that no person "shall ... be twice put
in jeopardy of life or limb" for the same offense. U.S. CONST. amend. V, § 2.
90. Breed, 421 U.S. at 528.
91. Id. at 529.
92. Id. at 535.
93. Id. at 531.
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either by upsetting the balance of informality and flexibility or by
hindering the administration of the system.94 To ensure that these
interests would remain unharmed, the Chief Justice admitted, most
transfer decisions would need to be made before the adjudication
process actually commenced. 95
B. Contemporary Statutes
All states and the District of Columbia currently provide by
statute certain circumstances in which a juvenile may be trans-
ferred to criminal court. Although the statutes differ from state to
state, three main types exist: "judicial waiver" statutes, "legislative
waiver" statutes, and "prosecutorial waiver" statutes. Most states
have adopted more than one of these forms of transfer in their
juvenile courts.96 While many states have ratified "reverse waiver"
statutes providing that certain juveniles may be transferred from
criminal court back to juvenile court, many states also have ratified
"termination" statutes, which mandate that juveniles tried and
convicted as adults will forever lose their juvenile status.
1. Judicial Waiver
The transfer hearings conducted by the juvenile court judge in
Breed v. Jones were governed by a judicial waiver statute. Judicial
waiver statutes generally require that juveniles who have (1)
reached a certain age, and (2) committed an act that would
constitute a serious felony if committed by an adult, should undergo
a transfer hearing before a juvenile court judge.98 After making a
limited factual finding, if the state even so requires, the judge must
determine whether the interests of the juvenile and society would
be met by transferring the juvenile to criminal court.99 Unless these
"amenability findings" dictate otherwise, the judge has discretion,
94. See id. at 535-39.
95. See id. at 535-36.
96. Florida, for example, has adopted all three types of waiver. See FLA. STAT. ANN. §
985.226(3) (West 2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 985.227(1) (West 2001 & Supp. 2006); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 985.227(2) (West 2001 & Supp. 2006).
97. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
98. See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 561 (1966).
99. See id. at 556-57.
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or sometimes is mandated, to waive juvenile court jurisdiction so
that the juvenile may be tried as an adult.100
Forty-five states and the District of Columbia have some form of
judicial waiver statute.'1 Although no two are identical, these
statutes have common elements. One significant element is the
level of proof necessary for the judge to make factual findings.
Twenty states, for example, explicitly require that the judge find
probable cause that the juvenile committed the act or acts with
which he is charged before the transfer process may continue.' 2
100. See, e.g., 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/5-805(2) (West 1999 & Supp. 2005) (requiring
that juveniles charged with certain serious offenses face a rebuttable presumption of transfer
to criminal court); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-30-3-2 (LexisNexis 2003) (providing that a judge may
waive jurisdiction if he finds that the juvenile was at least fourteen years old, has been
charged with a "heinous or aggravated" act, has no potential for rehabilitation, and should
in the best interest of society be tried as an adult).
101. See ALA. CODE § 12-15-34 (LexisNexis 2005); ALASKA STAT. § 47.12.100 (2004); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-327 (1999); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-318 (2002 & Supp. 2005); CAL. WELF.
& INST. CODE §§ 707(a), 707(c) (West 1998 & Supp. 2006); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-2-518 (2005);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-127(b) (West 2004 & Supp. 2006); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §
1010 (1999 & Supp. 2004); D.C. CODE § 16-2307 (2001 & Supp. 2005); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
985.226(3) (West 2001); GA. CODEANN. § 15-11-30.2 (2005); HAW. REV. STAT. § 571-22 (1993
& Supp. 2005); IDAHO CODEANN. § 20-508 (2004); 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/5-805 (West
1999 & Supp. 2005); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-30-3-2 to -6 (LexisNexis 2003); IOWA CODE ANN. §
232.45 (West 2000 & Supp. 2006); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1636 (2000); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
635.020,640.010 (LexisNexis 1999 & Supp. 2005); LA. CHILD. CODEANN. arts. 857-62 (2004);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 3101(4) (2003 & Supp. 2005); MD. CODE ANN., CTs. & JUD.
PROC. § 3-8A-06 (LexisNexis 2002); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 712A.4 (West 2002); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 260B.125 (West 2003); MISS. CODEANN. § 43-21-157 (West 1999 & Supp. 2005);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 211.071 (West 2004); MONT. CODEANN. § 41-5-203 (2005); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 62B.390(1) (LexisNexis Supp. 2003); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-B:24 (LexisNexis
2001 & Supp. 2005); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4A-26 (West 1987 & Supp. 2006); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 7B-2202 to -2203 (2005); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-34(1)(b)-(c) (2006); OHIO REV. CODEANN.
§ 2152.12 (West 2005); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 7303-4.3(B) (West 1998 & Supp. 2006); OR.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 419C.349, 419C.352 (West 2003 & Supp. 2005); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 6355(a) (West 2000); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 14-1-7 to -7.2 (2002); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-7605
(Supp. 2005); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-134 (2005); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.02 (Vernon
2002); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3a-603 (2002 & Supp. 2005); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 5506
(2001); VA. CODEANN. § 16.1-269.1(A)-(C) (West 2001 & Supp. 2005); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 13.40.110 (West 2004); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 49-5-10 (LexisNexis 2004); WIS. STAT. ANN. §
938.18 (West 2000); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-6-237 (2005).
102. See ALA. CODE § 12-15-34(f) (LexisNexis 2005); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-327(c)
(1999); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-2-518(3)(a) (2005); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-127(b) (West
2004 & Supp. 2005); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 985.226(3)(c) (West 2001); 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
405/5-805(3)(a) (West 1999 & Supp. 2005); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-30-3-2 to -5 (LexisNexis
2003); IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.45(6)(b) (West 2000 & Supp. 2006); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
640.010(2)(a) (LexisNexis 1999 & Supp. 2005); LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 862(A)(1) (2004);
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Seven states require only that the judge find by a preponderance of
the evidence, or else by a reasonableness or prima facie standard,
that the juvenile committed the acts."0 3 The remaining states, as
well as the District of Columbia, require no particular level of proof.
No state has required a reasonable doubt standard before a judge
may waive juvenile court jurisdiction.
More so than the other types of transfer statute, the judicial
waiver statute "embodies the juvenile court's approach to individu-
alized sentencing."104 That being said, the juvenile judge's relatively
high level of discretion under these statutes clearly creates
problems of its own:
Like individualized sentencing, the subjectivity of waiver
decisions produces inequities and disparities. Judges cannot
administer discretionary statutes on an evenhanded basis.
Within a single jurisdiction, "justice by geography" prevails as
courts interpret and apply the same law inconsistently. National
evaluations of judicial waiver provide compelling evidence that
it is arbitrary, capricious, and discriminatory. A youth's race, as
well as geographic locale, affects waiver decisions. Idiosyncratic
differences in judicial philosophy or the location of the hearing
are more important than the nature of the crime. In short,
judicial waiver exhibits all the characteristic defects of discre-
tionary sentencing.105
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 3001(4)(E)(1) (2003); MICH. COMP. LAWSANN. § 712A.4(3) (West
2002); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260B.125 subdiv. 3 (West 2003); MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-21-157(3)
(West 1999 & Supp. 2005); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A4A-26(a)(2) (West 1987 & Supp. 2006); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 27-20-34(1)(b) (2006); OHIOREV. CODEANN. § 2152.12(A)(1)(d) (West 2005); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 5506(C)(1) (2001); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-269.1(D) (West 2001 & Supp.
2005); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 49-5-10(e) (LexisNexis 2004).
103. See ALASKA STAT. § 47.12.100(c)(1) (2004); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-30.2(a)(3) (2005);
MD. CODEANN., CTs. &JUD. PRoc. § 3-SA-06(d)(1) (LexisNexis 2002); N.D. CENT. CODE§ 27-
20-34(1)(c)(4) (2006); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6355 (West 2000); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-
134(a)(4) (2005); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-6-237 (2005).
104. Feld, supra note 8, at 703; see infra Part II.B.2-3.
105. Feld, supra note 8, at 704-05 (citations omitted). See supra notes 32-34 and
accompanying text for further discussion of the problems historically associated with overly
broad judicial discretion in the juvenile court system.
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This unbridled discretion is perhaps even more profound in the
eight states that have gone so far as to declare that any juvenile
may be transferred to criminal court, regardless of his age.
10 6
2. Legislative Waiver
Some state legislatures have awarded themselves the role of the
juvenile court judge in certain transfer decisions. With "legislative
waiver" statutes, these state legislatures have provided that
juveniles of a certain age who have committed certain acts automat-
ically will be tried in criminal court.10" Twenty-nine states have
provided for this automatic form of waiver."0 8 Of these states, six
exclude certain acts from being within a juvenile's capacity; in other
words, one who could commit such an act cannot, by legal defini-
tion, be only a "juvenile."'0 9 The remaining states have modeled
106. See ALASKA STAT. § 47.12.100 (2004); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-327 (1999); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 3101(4) (2003 & Supp. 2005); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-203 (2005); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-B:24 (LexisNexis 2001 & Supp. 2005); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 7303-
4.3(B) (West 1998 & Supp. 2006); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3a-603 (2002 & Supp. 2005); WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 14-6-237 (2005).
107. Michigan, for example, has stipulated that "[t]he [criminal] court has jurisdiction to
hear and determine a specified juvenile violation if committed by a juvenile 14 years of age
or older and less than 17 years of age." MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 600.606(1) (West Supp.
2006).
108. ALA. CODE § 12-15.34.1(a) (LexisNexis 2005); ALASKA STAT. § 47.12.030 (2004); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-501(A) (2001 & Supp. 2005); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 602(b) (West
Supp. 2006); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-127(a) (West 2004 & Supp. 2006); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 985.227(2) (West 2001); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-28(b)(2)(A) (2005); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 20-
509 (2004); 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 405/5-130 (West 1999 & Supp. 2005); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 232.8 (West 2000 & Supp. 2006); LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 305(A) (2004); MD. CODE
ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-8A-03(d) (LexisNexis 2002 & Supp. 2005); MASS. GEN. LAws
ANN. ch. 119, § 74 (West 2003); MICH. COMP. LAWSANN. § 600.606 (West Supp. 2006); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 260B.007, subdiv. 6(b) (West 2003); MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-21-151(1) (West
1999); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 62B.330(3) (LexisNexis Supp. 2003); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-2-3
(West 2003 & Supp. 2005); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 30.00 (Consol. 1998 & Supp. 2006); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 7B-1604(a) (2005); OHIOREV. CODEANN. § 2152.10(A) (West 2005); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 10, § 7306-1.1 (West 1998); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 137.707 (West 2003); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 20-7-6605(1) (Supp. 2005); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 26-11-3.1 (2004); UTAH CODEANN. § 78-3a-
601 (2002 & Supp. 2005); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 5502 (2001); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
13.04.030(1)(e)(v) (West 2004); WiS. STAT. ANN. § 938.183(1)-(2) (West 2000 & Supp. 2005).
109. See 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/5-130 (West 1999 & Supp. 2005); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 260B.007(6)(b) (West 2003); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 62B.330(3) (LexisNexis Supp. 2003);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-2-3(H) (West 2003 & Supp. 2005); S.C. CODEANN. § 20-7-6605(1); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 5502 (2001).
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their statutes after the judicial waiver statutes, except for the fact
that juveniles of certain age who have committed certain offenses
shall be tried in criminal court.
Legislative waiver statutes reflect the notion that state legisla-
tures, which created juvenile courts in the first place, "may modify
the courts' jurisdictions as they please.""10 These statutes effec-
tively eliminate the flexibility of juvenile courts, as they offer no
possibility for an individual to remain in juvenile court for
amenability reasons. Indeed, "[u]sing offenses to structure or
eliminate judicial discretion repudiates rehabilitation, narrows
juvenile court jurisdiction, reduces its clientele, and denies it the
opportunity even to try to treat certain youths.""' One may view
legislative waiver statutes, then, in one of two ways: (1) as an
efficient counterbalance to the juvenile court system's abuses in
discretion, or (2) as a dangerously oversimplified solution to the
complex problem of determining which juveniles truly should be
tried in criminal court.
3. Prosecutorial Waiver
A few states have provided that the juvenile court and the
criminal court exercise dual jurisdiction over juveniles of certain
age who have committed certain crimes. In these situations, the
charging prosecutor makes the transfer decision in lieu of a judge
or the state legislature. Because both court systems already have
jurisdiction over such juveniles, the prosecutor enjoys absolute
discretion in deciding which court system shall hear the charge."
2
Twelve states currently supply this discretion via a "prosecutorial
waiver" statute." 3 These statutes combine elements from the
110. Feld, supra note 8, at 706.
111. Id. at 708.
112. A county attorney in Montana, for example, "may, in [his] discretion[,] ... file with the
[criminal] court a motion for leave to file an information in the (criminal] court" for juveniles
over sixteen years of age who committed certain enumerated violent crimes, and for juveniles
over twelve years of age who committed nonconsensual sexual intercourse, assault of a peace
or judicial officer, homicide, or attempted homicide. MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-206(1) (2005).
113. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-501(B) (2001 & Supp. 2005); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-
318(c) (2002 & Supp. 2005); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 707(d) (West Supp. 2005); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 19-2-517 (2005); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 985.227(1) (West 2001 & Supp. 2006); LA. CHILD.
CODE ANN. art. 305(B) (2004); MASS. GEN. LAWSANN. ch. 119, § 54 (West 2003); MONT. CODE
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judicial and legislative waiver statutes. Although the state legisla-
tures grant dual jurisdiction over juveniles, the ultimate decision to
transfer the juvenile, as with judicial waiver statutes, rests with
one person. Unlike the judicial waiver statutes, the decision maker
is not a judge but a prosecutor, who, as such, is not required to base
his decision on any factual or amenability finding, or even on any
due process consideration. For this reason, and especially in
consideration of certain studies showing prosecutors to be especially
prone to political pressure and racial bias," 4 many have questioned
the fairness of prosecutorial waiver statutes." 5
4. Post-waiver Statutes
Not all juvenile transfers are final. Most states provide that,
under certain circumstances, juveniles who face trial in criminal
court may instead be transferred back to the juvenile court
system." 6 These "reverse waiver" statutes serve to correct some of
the inconsistencies of juvenile transfer proceedings. Six states, for
example, allow a juvenile convicted in criminal court to sometimes
ANN. § 41-5-206 (2005); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-276 (1998); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-B:25
(LexisNexis 2001); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 5505(c) (2001 & Supp. 2005); WYO. STAT. ANN. §
14-6-203(f) (2005).
114. See Matthew William Bell, Comment, Prosecutorial Waiver in Michigan and
Nationwide, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1071, 1082-84.
115. See Gerard F. Glynn, Arkansas' Missed Opportunity for Rehabilitation: Sending
Children toAdult Courts, 20 U.ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 77,88-89 (1997); Bell, supra note 114,
at 1082-84; Joshua T. Rose, Note, Innocence Lost: The Detrimental Effect ofAutomatic Waiver
Statutes on Juvenile Justice, 41 BRANDEIS L.J. 977, 983-84 (2003).
116. Twenty-six states, as well as the District of Columbia, have some form of "reverse
waiver" statute. See ALASKA STAT. § 47.12.030(a) (2004); ARK. CODEANN. § 9-27-318(j) (2002
& Supp. 2005); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-2-518(d)(II)-(V ") (2005); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-
127(b) (West 2004 & Supp. 2006); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 1011 (1999); D.C. CODE § 16-2302
(2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 985.233 (West 2001 & Supp. 2006); GA. CODEANN. § 15-11-28(b)(2)
(2005); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 20-509(4) (2004); IOWA CODE ANN. § 803.6 (West 2003); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 640.010(3) (LexisNexis 1999 & Supp. 2005); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 4-
202 (LexisNexis 2001 & Supp. 2005); MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-21-159(4) (West 1999 & Supp.
2004); MO. ANN. STAT. § 211.073 (West 2004); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-206(3) (2005); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 43-261 (2004); NEV. REV. STAT.ANN. § 62B.390(3) (LexisNexis Supp. 2003); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-B:25 (LexisNexis 2001); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 190.71, 210.43
(Consol. 1996 & Supp. 2006); OKLA STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 7306-1.1(E) (West 1998); OR. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 137.707(5)(b)(A) (West 2003); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 26-11-4 (2004); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 27-1-159(d) (2005); VT. STAT.ANN. tit. 33, §§ 5505(e)-(f), 5506(h) (2001); VA. CODEANN.
§ 16.1-269.6(B) (West 2001 & Supp. 2005); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 970.032(2) (West 1998); WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 14-6-237 (2005).
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be sent back to the juvenile court system for sentencing. 117 Four
states allow such an individual to be sentenced in juvenile court if
he was convicted only of a lesser included offense or misde-
meanor."" Fourteen states even allow a trial judge in criminal court
to overturn the legislative or prosecutorial waiver of a juvenile by
finding that a juvenile court adjudication would best meet the
interests of the juvenile and society."9 Of course, reverse waiver
statutes cannot completely protect all juveniles from the potential
abuses of judicial and prosecutorial waiver, or conversely from the
automatic nature of legislative waiver. 2 °
At the other end of the spectrum are "termination" statutes.
Twenty-three states, as well as the District of Columbia, have
ratified this type of statute. 2' Essentially, these statutes require
that a juvenile tried and convicted in criminal court shall be tried
in criminal court for any offense thereafter. No matter the age,
117. See ALASKA STAT. § 47.12.030(a) (2004);ARK. CODEANN. § 9-27-318(j) (2002 & Supp.
2005); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-2-518(d)(II)-(IV) (2005); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 985.233 (West 2001);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 211.073 (West 2004); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-B:25 (LexisNexis 2001).
118. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-2-518(d)(IV) (2005); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 985.233(4)(a) (West
2001 & Supp. 2006); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 137.707(5)(b)(A) (West 2003); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
33, § 5506(h).
119. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-127(b) (West 2004 & Supp. 2006); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 985.233(4)(a) (West 2001 & Supp. 2006); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-28(b)(2) (2005); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 803.6 (West 2003); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 4-202(b) (LexisNexis 2001 & Supp.
2005); MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-21-159(4) (West 1999 & Supp. 2004); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-
206(3) (2005); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-261 (2004); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 190.71, 210.43
(Consol. 1996 & Supp. 2006); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 7306-1.1(E) (West 1998); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 26-11-4 (2004); TENN. CODE. ANN. § 37-1-159(d) (2005); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
33, § 5505(e)-(f) (2001); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 970.032(2) (West 1998).
120. In addition, twenty-four states do not seem to have any reverse waiver statute at all.
Cf. supra note 116.
121. See ALA. CODE §§ 12-15-34(j), -34.1(b) (LexisNexis 2005); D.C. CODE § 16-2307(h)
(2001 & Supp. 2005); HAW. REV. STAT. § 571-22(e) (Supp. 2005); IDAHO CODEANN. § 20-509(3)
(2004); 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/5-130(6) (West 1999 & Supp. 2005); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 31-30-3-6 (LexisNexis 2003); IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.45A (West 2000); KAN. STAT. ANN. §
38-1636(h) (2000); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 3101(4)(G) (2003); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 712A.4(5) (West 2002); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260B. 125(5) (West 2003); MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-
21-157(8) (West 1999 & Supp. 2005); MO. ANN. STAT. § 211.071(9) (West 2004); NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. 62B.330(3)(e) (LexisNexis Supp. 2003); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-B:27
(LexisNexis 2001); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-1604(b) (2005); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-34(4)
(Supp. 2006); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 7343-4.3(D)-(E) (West Supp. 2006); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 14-1-7.3(g) (2002); TENN. CODEANN. § 37-1-134(c) (2005); TEX. FAM. CODEANN. § 54.02(m)
(Vernon 2002); UTAH CODEANN. § 78-3a-601(3) (Supp. 2005); VA. CODEANN. §§ 16.1-269.6(C),
-271 (West 2001 & Supp. 2005); WiS. STAT. ANN. § 938.183(1)(b) (West 2000 & Supp. 2005).
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no matter the offense, the juvenile can never again enjoy the
benefits of the juvenile court system. Under the law, his right to be
a juvenile is terminated.
III. THE ADVENT OF APPRENDI
A. Making the Jury the Constitutional Fact-finder
Much like the juvenile court system, the concept of sentencing
in traditional criminal trials has significantly changed since the
colonial era. The early colonists, rejecting the English legal
tradition, gave the jury a substantial role in sentencing.122 Although
the early federal courts had a minimal role in the criminal process,
most state courts diligently upheld the tradition of jury sentencing
until the twentieth century. 123 In the few states that allowed
judicial sentencing, judges had little discretion beyond applying the
sentencing schemes that state legislatures provided them.'24
Gradually the norm of jury sentencing was replaced by the
concept of discretionary judicial sentencing. By the mid-twentieth
century, sentencing became, as one scholar has characterized, "a
Wild West of unregulated discretion."'25 With a deficiency of
reviewable boundaries, the inequities and irrationalities of judicial
sentencing became readily apparent.'26 Ironically, the rise of
judicial sentencing came about from the same rehabilitative ideals
that Progressives had imposed on the earliest juvenile courts.'27
As with the juvenile courts, modern American jurisprudence has
largely replaced the rehabilitation model of criminal courts with a
sentencing system based on the theory of retribution."'2 This system
122. Morris B. Hoffman, The Case for Jury Sentencing, 52 DUKE L.J. 951, 963 (2003).
123. Id. at 964.
124. See Steven L. Chanenson, The Next Era of Sentencing Reform, 54 EMORY L.J. 377,
391 (2005); Hoffman, supra note 122, at 964.
125. See Chanenson, supra note 124, at 392.
126. See id. at 393-94. The disparity in sentencing by different judges for similar crimes,
as well as an apparent trend of racial bias (that is, black offenders receiving longer sentences
than white offenders for comparable offenses), were two such problems. Id. at 393.
127. See Hoffman, supra note 122, at 965-66. For an overview of the Progressives'
rehabilitation doctrine and the problems associated with absolute judicial discretion in the
early juvenile courts, see supra notes 21-33 and accompanying text.
128. See Hoffman, supra note 122, at 967-68. For a brief discussion of the juvenile court
system's shift in sentencing philosophy from rehabilitation to retribution, see supra notes 69-
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operates on the assumption that "criminal acts deserve proportion-
ate retribution."'129 Statutory sentencing guidelines have replaced
sentencing decisions that were left almost entirely to the judge's
discretion. 3 ' Although some states' guidelines are only advisory,
others are mandatory or highly prescriptive.' 3 ' In any event,
sentencing guidelines establish suggestive or presumptive sentenc-
ing ranges for specific crimes, within which judges retain some
flexibility in imposing sentences for individual defendants.'32
The problem with sentencing guidelines is determining the limits
to the legislature's ability to define elements of crimes, other factors
that come into play during sentencing, and the difference between
the two.'33 The U.S. Supreme Court provided constitutional
meaning to this problem in Apprendi v. New Jersey.' The Court,
relying on recent case precedent, declared for the first time that the
Sixth Amendment guarantees not only a jury trial, but also jury
sentencing to a certain extent.'35 Writing the opinion of the Court,
Justice Stevens first noted that among the principles rooted in
traditional common law is the "right to have the jury verdict [in a
criminal case] based on proof beyond a reasonable doubt."'36 The
Founding Fathers, Justice Stevens pointed out, would not have
recognized the "distinction between an 'element' of a felony offense
72 and accompanying text.
129. Hoffman, supra note 122, at 967-68.
130. See Chanenson, supra note 124, at 395-96.
131. See id. at 396.
132. See id. at 396-97.
133. See Benjamin J. Priester, Constitutional Formalism and the Meaning of Apprendi v.
New Jersey, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 281, 284-86 (2001).
134. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
135. See Hoffman, supra note 122, at 974-78. In Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227
(1999), the Court had distinguished case facts from sentencing elements, stating that case
facts are elements of an offense that "must be charged in the indictment, submitted to a jury,
and proven by the Government beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 232. As a matter of
statutory interpretation, the Court held only that these facts each must have been specified
in the indictment and proven to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. See id. at 251-52. In
rendering this holding, the Court exempted from the jury requirement proof of prior
convictions, noting that "a prior conviction must itself have been established through
procedures satisfying the fair notice, reasonable doubt, and jury trial guarantees." Id. at 249.
136. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 478. Ironically, the Court here cited the holding of In re
Winship, which, as explained before, established a procedural right to juvenile court
proceedings. See id.; supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
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and a 'sentencing factor"' as exists in contemporary sentencing
practices."'
The petitioner in Apprendi had fired gunshots into the home of
an African American family; he was charged with, and pled guilty
to, second-degree unlawful possession of a firearm. 13 A separate
New Jersey statute allowed a trial judge to enhance a defendant's
sentence beyond the normal range for the firearm offense if the
judge found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant
committed the offense with the intent to intimidate a person or
group because of race." 9 Although petitioner had not even been
charged under this statute, the trial judge made the requisite
finding of intent following the prosecutor's motion.'40 Petitioner,
who under the second-degree felony charge alone would have served
a prison term of five to ten years, instead was sentenced to a
twelve-year prison term.' He argued on appeal that due process
required that a jury find the element of racial bias beyond a
reasonable doubt.' 4
2
The Supreme Court agreed with petitioner. "As a matter of
simple justice," wrote Justice Stevens, "it seems obvious that the
procedural safeguards designed to protect [petitioner] from un-
warranted pains should apply equally to the two acts that New
Jersey has singled out for punishment.' 43 The New Jersey hate
crime statute's "sentence enhancement factor," in this sense, was no
different than any other element of an offense a jury normally
would find.'44 Acknowledging that criminal trial practices may
137. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 478.
138. Id. at 469-70 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-6(a)(2) (West 1995)).
139. See id. at 468-69 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-3(e) (West Supp. 1999-2000)).
140. Id. at 470-71. The trial judge heldahearing to determine the "purpose" of petitioner's
shooting. Id. at 470. Petitioner earlier had confessed to police that he did not want the
occupants of the house in his neighborhood because of their race; however, he later retracted
this statement. Id. at 469. At the hearing, petitioner explained that he was intoxicated at the
time of the shooting and that he had no bias against African Americans. Id. at 471. Petitioner
also introduced the testimonies of a psychologist and seven character witnesses to support
this claim. Id. at 470-71. The trial judge, nevertheless, found the evidence to support a
finding that petitioner was motivated by racial bias. Id. at 471.
141. Id. at 470, 471. Petitioner had also pled guilty to a third-degree offense, the sentence
for which set to run concurrently with that of the second-degree offense. See id. at 469-70.
142. Id. at 471.
143. Id. at 476 (emphasis added).
144. See id.
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change over time, Justice Stevens explained that they must always
adhere to basic principles of fairness. 145 Those principles, to a
certain degree, must extend "to determinations that [go] not to a
defendant's guilt or innocence, but simply to the length of his
sentence.'46 Citing In re Winship, Justice Stevens also stressed the
"vital role" of the reasonable doubt requirement in the criminal
process.' 47 Because of its importance, and because of the heightened
loss of liberty and social stigma attached to a more significant
sentence, the reasonable doubt requirement had to be included
among the procedural safeguards for sentencing enhancements. 148
The Court ultimately held that, "[o]ther than the fact of a prior
conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond
the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and
proved beyond a reasonable doubt."'149
B. Interpreting Apprendi
In rendering its holding in Apprendi, the Court understood that
it was making a broad statement on the jury's role in the adminis-
tration of justice-a statement with potentially overreaching
effects. It attempted to prevent those effects from manifesting down
the road by explaining in its written opinion how sentencing
schemes may be modified-rather than destroyed-and still satisfy
the jury requirement. Justice Stevens specifically defended the
holding against Justice O'Connor's dissenting argument that the
Court had established an unwarranted "constitutional rule."'5 °
First, Justice Stevens emphasized that the "rule" applied only to
145. See id. at 484-85; see also id. at 498 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("The founders of the
American Republic were not prepared to leave [the administration of criminal justice] to the
State, which is why the jury-trial guarantee was one of the least controversial provisions of
the Bill of Rights. It has never been efficient; but it has always been free.").
146. Id. at 484 (majority opinion) (alteration in original) (quoting Almendarez-Torres v.
United States, 523 U.S. 224, 251 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
147. See id.
148. See id. at 483-84.
149. Id. at 490.
150. See id. at 524 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). "In one bold stroke," Justice O'Connor wrote,
"the Court today casts aside our traditional cautious approach and instead embraces a
universal and seemingly bright-line rule limiting the power of Congress and state
legislatures to define criminal offenses and the sentences that follow from convictions
thereunder." Id. at 525.
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statutes that enhanced sentences beyond the prescribed statutory
range for a given offense. 5' A judge still could consider sentencing
factors that may aggravate or mitigate a sentence within that
statutory range." 2 A sentence enhancement, "[o]n the other hand,
... is the functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense
than the one covered by the jury's guilty verdict. Indeed, it fits
squarely within the usual definition of an 'element' of the
offense."'5 3 Second, in considering whether a sentencing factor is an
element to be determined by a jury, Justice Stevens explained that
"the relevant inquiry is one not of form, but of effect-does the
required finding expose the defendant to a greater punishment than
that authorized by the jury's guilty verdict?"'" Even with these two
clarifications, however, the Court was not yet finished.
1. Subsequent Cases
In Blakely v. Washington, the Court made clear that "the
'statutory maximum' for Apprendi purposes is the maximum
sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected
in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant."'55 Justice Scalia
elaborated on behalf of the Court:
In other words, the relevant "statutory maximum" is not the
maximum sentence a judge may impose after finding additional
facts, but the maximum he may impose without any additional
findings. When a judge inflicts punishment that the jury's
verdict alone does not allow, the jury has not found all the facts
"which the law makes essential to the punishment," and the
judge exceeds his proper authority. '
In Ring v. Arizona,'57 meanwhile, the Court considered whether
Apprendi's rule applied to capital defendants, when an aggravating
element, if found to exist, could enhance the sentence from a prison
151. See id. at 494 n.19 (majority opinion).
152. See id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 494 (emphasis added).
155. 542 U.S. 296, 303 (2004).
156. Id. at 303-04 (citation omitted).
157. 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
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term to the death penalty. Relying on Apprendi's "not form, but
effect" argument,158 the Court concluded that "[c] apital defendants,
no less than noncapital defendants, ... are entitled to a jury
determination of any fact on which the legislature conditions an
increase in their maximum punishment."'59 Addressing the
argument that an experienced judge is the better authority with
which to entrust the finding of facts that may lead to the death
penalty, the Court flatly responded that "the superiority of judicial
factfinding in capital cases is far from evident."'6 ° In addition, the
Court argued, the administration of criminal justice, including the
ability to impose the death penalty on a convicted defendant, never
was meant to be left to the will and whim of the State alone.
161
One issue that has been debated by federal circuit courts, but not
yet by the Supreme Court, is whether prior juvenile adjudications
should count under the "prior convictions" exception to the
Apprendi jury requirement." 2 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit concluded in United States v. Tighe that prior juvenile
adjudications are not "prior convictions" underApprendi and should
not be used to enhance sentences unless proven to a jury like any
other element of an offense.' 63 The court characterized the relatively
informal juvenile adjudication as lacking the "certainty" attached
to the 'fact' of prior conviction" that allowed the Supreme Court to
exempt such a fact from its jury requirement in Apprendi."' The
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit disagreed with this
rationale in United States v. Smalley.'65 The court in Smalley
argued that juvenile adjudications indeed are reliable for Apprendi
purposes.'66 The court cited the rights to notice, counsel, and
158. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494.
159. Ring, 536 U.S. at 589.
160. Id. at 607.
161. See id. (citing Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 498 (Scalia, J., concurring)).
162. The case opinions that follow focus on the federal Armed Career Criminal Act, which
in part mandates that a person who violates a specified criminal statute, and who has three
prior convictions for violent felonies or serious drug offenses, "shall" be sentenced for a
minimum of fifteen years. 18 U.S.C.A. § 924(e) (West Supp. 2005).
163. 266 F.3d 1187, 1194 (9th Cir. 2001).
164. See id. at 1193-94 (quotingApprendi, 530 U.S. at 488). In making this point, the court
specifically cited the holding in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania. See supra Part I.C for a discussion
of McKeiver's denial of a jury guarantee in juvenile adjudications.
165. 294 F.3d 1030 (8th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1114 (2003).
166. See id. at 1033.
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confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses, as well as the
privilege against self-incrimination, as sufficient procedures to
guarantee the reliability of juvenile adjudications." 7
This circuit split, though still unresolved by the Supreme Court,
does prove at least that the Apprendi holding is ripe for consider-
ation in the context of the juvenile court system. Any further
consideration of the Tighe/Smalley conflict is beyond the scope of
this Note;6 ' however, this Note now will address Apprendi's
applicability to another issue unique to the juvenile court system.
2. Courts that Have Not Applied Apprendi to Juvenile
Transfers
With the advent of the Apprendi decision in 2000, several federal
circuit and state supreme courts have debated the applicability of
the jury guarantee to juvenile transfer proceedings. Although
Apprendi itself made no reference to juvenile proceedings at all,
some juveniles sent to criminal court have been quick to invoke the
constitutional rule that Apprendi imposed on criminal trials. If due
process considerations require that a jury find all facts that may
enhance a criminal sentence beyond the statutory maximum, surely
they also would require a jury to make factual findings that would
send a juvenile to a court system with a significantly enhanced
sentencing range for the same offense.
Of the courts that have considered this possibility, however, most
have said that Apprendi does not apply. Although the circumstances
of the cases varied, the courts have offered the same basic argu-
ments against a jury requirement. The Kansas Supreme Court was
one of the first state courts of last resort to decide against Apprendi
167. See id. Other circuit courts since have followed Smalley's holding and rationale. See
United States v. Burge, 407 F.3d 1183, 1191 (11th Cir. 2005); United States v. Jones, 332
F.3d 688, 696 (3d Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1150 (2004).
168. For an in-depth examination of this problem, however, see generally Jeremy W.
Hochberg, Note, Should Juvenile Adjudications Count as Prior Convictions for Apprendi
Purposes?, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1159 (2004); Douglas M. Schneider, Note, But I Was Just
a Kid!: Does Using Juvenile Adjudications To Enhance Adult Sentences Run Afoul of
Apprendi v. New Jersey?, 26 CARDoZo L. REV. 837 (2005); Brian P. Thill, Comment, Prior
"Convictions" Under Apprendi- Why Juvenile Adjudications May Not Be Used To Increase an
Offender's Sentence Exposure if They Have Not First Been Proven to a Jury Beyond a
Reasonable Doubt, 87 MARQ. L. REV. 573 (2004).
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application. In State v. Jones, the sixteen-year-old petitioner argued
that the trial court's decision to authorize adult prosecution on the
charge of first-degree murder substantially increased the penalty
he would face upon conviction.'69 Consequently, under the princi-
ples of Apprendi, his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were
violated because a jury should have found beyond a reasonable
doubt the facts necessary to authorize the transfer. 170
The Kansas court disagreed with this argument for three
reasons. First, it pointed out that juveniles had always been treated
"under a comprehensive system which has been modified by statute
and case law."'' That separate system, the court reasoned,
necessarily "treated juveniles different than they would be treated
under adult criminal systems."'72 The procedural safeguards
already granted to juveniles were "adequate to withstand the
demands for jury determinations within the juvenile system, as well
as to support other differences afforded in the adult system but not
in the juvenile system."'7 3 Second, the court argued that the
decision to transfer a juvenile to criminal court "does not involve
guilt or innocence, but involves the determination of which system
will be appropriate for a juvenile offender."'74 Once transferred, the
juvenile "will be subjected to the statutory maximum sentence
under the applicable criminal statute only after a jury has deter-
mined his or her guilt beyond a reasonable doubt."'75 Only then, the
court implied, should the rule of Apprendi take effect. Finally, the
court argued that adding a jury requirement to the transfer process
is contrary to the convention that "[t]he juvenile system is differ-
169. 47 P.3d 783, 786 (Kan. 2002), cert. denied, Jones v. Kansas, 537 U.S. 980 (2002).
170. See id. at 793. In making this argument, petitioner implied that the applicable
"statutory maximum" for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a defendant may
receive in the juvenile court system, which was considerably less than the type of sentence
to which the defendant would be subject in criminal court. See id. at 794.
171. Id. at 795 (citing In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967)).
172. Id.
173. Id. On this point, the court cited an earlier Kansas case, in which it had reasoned
that the state juvenile court system was not constitutionally required but rather created by
statute, and therefore did not need to provide all of the procedural safeguards required in the
adult system. Id. at 795 (citing State v. Hitt, 42 P.3d 732, 738 (Kan. 2002)).
174. Id. at 798.
175. Id.
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ent," and "potentially [would] erode some of the protections offered
by the juvenile system.' 76
Most of the courts that have decided against Apprendi appli-
cation have offered the same reasons as the Kansas Supreme
Court did in Jones.17 7 The New Mexico Supreme Court, however,
approached the issue from a different angle. The New Mexico
legislature had created a unique juvenile transfer system: all
juveniles would be tried in juvenile court, after which the judge
could sentence certain offenders as adults following an amenability
hearing.17 In State v. Gonzales, thus, petitioner argued only that
Apprendi required a jury to make the amenability determination.179
The court disagreed, noting, "a determination that a child is not
amenable to treatment within the juvenile system differs from
findings related to the elements of crime."'8 ° The court gave three
reasons supporting this finding:
First, while findings of guilt are measures of the degree of an
individual's criminal culpability, the finding that a child is or is
not amenable to treatment is a measure of a child's prospects for
rehabilitation. Second, while findings of guilt are based on
historical facts susceptible of proof beyond a reasonable doubt,
a finding that a child is not amenable to rehabilitation requires
a prediction of future conduct based on complex considerations
of the child, the child's crime, and the child's history and
environment. Third, a determination of amenability or eligibility
for commitment requires some foreknowledge of available
facilities and the programs in them that trial judges who make
sentencing decisions every day have, while juries do not.'81
176. Id.
177. See, e.g., United States v. Miguel, 338 F.3d 995, 1004 (9th Cir. 2003) ("Apprendi does
not require that a jury find the facts that allow the transfer to [criminal] court. The transfer
proceeding establishes the [criminal] court's jurisdiction over a defendant."); People v.
Beltran, 765 N.E.2d 1071, 1075-76 (111. 2002) (denying Apprendi application because (1) the
due process standards of a juvenile proceeding do not require a jury, and (2) a transfer
hearing"is dispositional, not adjudicatory); Caldwellv. Commonwealth, 133 S.W.3d 445,453
(Ky. 2004) (adopting the "jurisdiction" argument, and additionally holding that the transfer
process "does not violate the fair hearing requirement of [Kent v. United States]").
178. See State v. Gonzales, 24 P.3d 776, 781 (N.M. 2001).
179. See id. at 783.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 783-84.
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Like the Kansas court in State v. Jones, the New Mexico court
concluded that mandating a jury for amenability findings "would
require an overly broad interpretation of Apprendi." 2
3. An Exception
The first court that considered Apprendi's applicability to
juvenile transfer decided that the jury guarantee should extend to
those proceedings. In Commonwealth v. Quincy Q., the Massachu-
setts Supreme Judicial Court considered the constitutionality of a
prosecutorial waiver statute, under which the prosecutor initially
charged petitioner as a youthful offender in the criminal court.18 3
Unlike the courts that later would deny the jury requirement for
juvenile transfer proceedings, the court in Quincy Q. had no
problem comparing the Massachusetts statute with the hate crime
statute in Apprendi.'" Much like the Apprendi statute, the court
argued, the Massachusetts statute "authorizes judges to increase
the punishment for juveniles convicted of certain offenses beyond
the statutory maximum otherwise permitted for juveniles. 18 5 For
that reason, the court held that petitioner's motion to dismiss the
subsequent indictment should have been granted.'86
The court was willing to apply Apprendi's jury guarantee in its
entirety to the Massachusetts statute. It found critical the fact that
a juvenile tried in criminal court could face a substantially greater
sentence than one who remained in juvenile court."8 7 For that
reason, the court believed that the enhanced status of "youthful
offender" may not be attached to a juvenile by the whim of the
182. Id. at 783.
183. See 753 N.E.2d 781, 786 (Mass. 2001), abrogated on other grounds by Commonwealth
v. King, 834 N.E.2d 1175, 1198-201 & 1201 n.28 (Mass. 2005). As authorized by the
Massachusetts "direct filing" statute, "[tihe commonwealth may proceed by complaint in
juvenile court or in a juvenile session of a [criminal] court, ... or by indictment as provided"
if the defendant was between the ages of fourteen and seventeen, and either (1) was charged
with an offense that could result in imprisonment if committed by an adult, and had
previously been committed to the department of youth services, or (2) was charged with an
offense involving the infliction or threat of serious bodily harm, or some other enumerated
offense. MAss. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 119, § 54 (West 1996).
184. See Quincy Q., 753 N.E.2d at 789; supra note 139 and accompanying text.
185. Quincy Q., 753 N.E.2d at 789.
186. See id. at 796.
187. See id. at 789.
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charging prosecutor alone, but only after a formal disposition. 188
The court recognized that a juvenile court system, along with its
"preferential treatment" of juveniles, "is not constitutionally
required,"'8 s but found that argument inconsequential to its
holding:
[O]nce the Legislature enacted a law providing that the maxi-
mum punishment for delinquent juveniles is commitment to the
Department of Youth Services for a defined time period, any
facts, including the requirements for youthful offender status,
that would increase the penalty for such juveniles must be
proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. 190
The court thus ordered that a jury must find beyond a reasonable
doubt all pending factual elements required under the prosecutorial
waiver statute before a juvenile may be tried as a youthful offender
in criminal court.' 9 '
IV. A PROPOSAL To INVOKE THE JURY FOR (SOME) JUVENILE
TRANSFERS
A. Defending the Right to a Jury Trial
If one thing is certain from the state and federal cases that have
addressed Apprendi's applicability to juvenile transfers, it is that
the potential for application exists.9 2 Granted, most courts that
have considered this issue have firmly held that Apprendi cannot
apply to the juvenile court system in any respect. Their arguments
188. See id. at 787.
189. Id. at 789.
190. Id. (citation omitted).
191. See id. at 789-90; supra note 183. The court also held that, at the indictment stage,
the grand jury must find by sufficient evidence that the requirements of the prosecutorial
waiver statute were met. See Quincy Q., 753 N.E.2d at 789. This finding seems comparable
to a grand jury's finding of probable cause that an offense has been committed before the
prosecutor may proceed with a trial against a criminal defendant.
192. See also Kevin R. Reitz, The New Sentencing Conundrum: Policy and Constitutional
Law at Cross-Purposes, 105 CoLUM. L. REv. 1082, 1121 (2005) (arguing that, although one
would think it unlikely that courts would apply the Apprendi rule to juvenile transfers,
"before Apprendi ... no one thought the Sixth Amendment had anything to do with factfinding
in the sentencing hearing either").
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against Apprendi's application, however, do not lay the issue to
rest. Their holdings likely reflect, to a certain degree, their
hesitance to add federal constitutional protections to state-created
institutions, absent, as one court expressly stated, "a clear mandate
from the United States Supreme Court."'93
This Note now will consider and attempt to refute the main
arguments that courts denying Apprendi application have brought
forth. It then will offer additional policy arguments that favor
adding a jury element to certain juvenile transfer decisions. Finally,
it will explain how existing judicial waiver, legislative waiver,
prosecutorial waiver, reverse waiver, and termination statutes may
be modified in a way that ensures the intended protections of
Apprendi and yet does not seriously disrupt the function of the
juvenile transfer system.
1. The "Effect" of Juvenile Transfer Is To Enhance Sentences
Perhaps the most impressive argument against applying
Apprendi to juvenile transfer proceedings is that those proceedings
do not determine either sentencing or one's guilt or innocence, per
se, but instead determine which jurisdiction-the juvenile court or
the criminal court-is appropriate for a particular juvenile.1 4
Proponents would argue that Apprendi's language, which requires
that a jury determine "any fact that increases the penalty for a
crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum,"'95 does not
encompass considerations of jurisdiction.
The U.S. Supreme Court, however, made one thing very clear in
Apprendi: "the relevant inquiry is one not of form, but of ef-
fect-does the required finding expose the defendant to a greater
punishment than that authorized by the jury's guilty verdict?"'196
Apprendi represented the judiciary's attempt to revise legislative
sentencing guidelines. These guidelines, the Court believed,
eliminated too much discretion in fact-finding that constitutionally
193. State v. Jones, 47 P.3d 783, 795 (Kan. 2002).
194. See United States v. Miguel, 338 F.3d 995, 1004 (9th Cir. 2003); People v. Beltran,
765 N.E.2d 1071, 1076 (Ill. 2002); Jones, 47 P.3d at 798; Caldwell v. Commonwealth, 133
S.W.3d 445, 453 (Ky. 2004).
195. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000).
196. Id. at 494 (emphasis added).
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should belong to the jury. With its "not form, but effect" argument,
the Supreme Court denied the states the absolute right to decide
which factors a jury may or may not determine. 9 7 In its decision in
Ring v. Arizona, the Court reaffirmed this principle, holding that
when the "effect" of a factual finding is to 'enhance a defendant's
sentence beyond the threshold of a jail term to the death penalty,
a jury must make that finding beyond a reasonable doubt. 9 '
Even if one regards a juvenile transfer proceeding as a purely
jurisdictional determination, the fact remains that the determina-
tion at the proceeding means the difference between a relatively
minor sentence following a juvenile adjudication and a much longer
sentence following a conviction in criminal court. Certainly,
juveniles have much at stake in transfer proceedings. The prospect
of facing a full-fledged trial, not to mention the increased loss of
liberty and social stigma attached to a conviction, are consider-
ations to which the Supreme Court has given substantial weight in
past decisions to grant procedural rights to juveniles.'99 The
implications of transfer are even more serious in the states with
termination statutes,20 0 where the transfer decision likely would
signal the end of an individual's statutory right to be treated as a
juvenile ever again.
The right to be treated as a juvenile is not constitutionally
guaranteed. It is, nevertheless, a tradition each state respects.201 As
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court suggested in Common-
wealth v. Quincy Q., once this tradition is in place, the states cannot
revoke the right merely at the whim and will of their legislative
bodies, nor by the whim and will of their judges or prosecutors.2 2
In fact, the U.S. Supreme Court has stepped in more than once to
impose constitutional guarantees on a juvenile court tradition that
197. See id.
198. See 536 U.S. 584, 602 (2002).
199. See Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 529, 535 (1975); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363
(1970).
200. See supra note 121.
201. See McGough & Cangelosi, supra note 30, at 1127-28.
202. See 753 N.E.2d 781,789 (Mass. 2001), abrogated on other grounds by Commonwealth
v. King, 834 N.E.2d 1175, 1198-201 & 1201 n.28 (Mass. 2005).
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supposedly had already provided greater protections for the accused
than a criminal court would.2" 3
Declaring a proceeding to be isolated from Apprendi's influence
merely because of the form of the statute authorizing that proceed-
ing is not a sufficient argument; Apprendi has made that much
clear.20 4 The effect of a juvenile transfer proceeding is the key issue
in determining whether Apprendi should apply. The effect of the
proceeding is to send a juvenile to criminal court. Its effect-indeed,
its very purpose-is to expose some juveniles to the possibility of a
much greater sentence for the same offense than they otherwise
would receive.20 5 Once a juvenile court system has been estab-
lished--once a state has imposed statutory limits on the sentencing
range that a juvenile court judge alone may impose on an individ-
ual-any factual finding that could punish the individual beyond
that range is a sentence enhancement under Apprendi. °6 A
sentence enhancement is precisely what will result when an
erstwhile juvenile is tried, convicted, and sentenced in criminal
court.
2. The Jury's Newfound Importance Outweighs Its Costs
In McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, the Supreme Court held that juries
are not a necessary part of accurate fact-finding.2 7 In the few years
since Apprendi, lower courts have relied heavily on this plurality
holding in their decisions not to extend a jury right to transfer
proceedings.20 8 Inherent in the McKeiver decision is the presump-
tion that juries lack the level of expertise that judges have in
deciding whether a particular juvenile is better suited for juvenile
court or criminal court.09 A jury requirement, the McKeiver
203. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 365 (1970); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 26, 33-34 (1967);
Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 562 (1966).
204. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 494 (2000).
205. See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
206. See Quincy Q., 753 N.E.2d at 789.
207. 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971) (plurality opinion).
208. See, e.g., People v. Beltran, 765 N.E.2d 1071, 1076 (1. 2002); State v. Jones, 47 P.3d
783, 795-96 (Kan. 2002).
209. See McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 551 (White, J., concurring); State v. Gonzales, 24 P.3d 776,
785 (N.M. 2001). The level of expertise required for amenability findings will be discussed
infra Part IV.A.4.
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plurality claimed, also would strap costly administrative burdens
on the juvenile court system.21°
Apprendi directly challenged the notion that juries are not
necessary as fact-finders. Indeed, the Apprendi rule has provided
new meaning to the jury's role in fact-finding. That role not only is
important, but, as Apprendi indicates, it is constitutionally
guaranteed.21' In rendering its holding, the Court was willing to
challenge recent innovations to sentencing procedures---specifically,
the sentencing guidelines-that it believed ran contrary to the long-
standing traditions of the common law.2 12 As with sentencing
guidelines, the juvenile transfer proceeding is a relatively recent
innovation to the common law tradition. 2" Like sentencing
guidelines, the juvenile transfer proceeding is a byproduct of
American society's modern embrace of the theory of retribution in
sentencing.214 In exposing the juvenile to a greater sentence in
criminal court, with little or no discretion afforded to a fact-finder
to decide otherwise, transfer statutes, like sentencing guidelines,215
are legal novelties. The Apprendi rule, by design, focused on
tempering the latter novelty with traditional constitutional rights;
it should not remain blocked from tempering the former.
As the Supreme Court itself has admitted, the mere novelty of a
sentencing practice does not necessarily make it unconstitutional.21
On the other hand, it certainly does not make the practice untouch-
able by the judiciary's guiding hand. Although the McKeiver plu-
rality held that a jury trial is not a constitutional requirement for
a juvenile adjudication,"7 it did not address the concept of juvenile
transfer. Juvenile transfer proceedings, which emerged long after
the first state juvenile court system and which continued to be
defined after the McKeiver decision, 18 cannot simply be equated
210. See McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 550 (plurality opinion).
211. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 484 (2000).
212. See id. at 478, 483-84.
213. See supra text accompanying notes 69-72.
214. See Feld, supra note 8, at 700-01.
215. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 482-83.
216. See id. at 483.
217. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971) (plurality opinion).
218. See supra text accompanying notes 69-72.
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with juvenile adjudications under the McKeiver rationale.219 In a
way, juvenile transfers more closely associate with traditional
criminal trials than with juvenile adjudications. They provide a
direct connection to the criminal court system from a juvenile court
system that initially was meant to remain isolated and independ-
ent.
As Justice Scalia indicated in his concurring opinion toApprendi,
the jury guarantee was never meant to be left to the will of the
State alone, despite the recent addition of sentencing guidelines.
2 1
In the same way, juvenile transfer proceedings should not remain
unaffected by the jury's newfound importance as fact-finder. The
Supreme Court already has held that this importance is undimin-
ished by any presumption that a judge is a greater "expert" in
considering factors that could send a defendant to his death.22'
Surely the factors that could send a juvenile to criminal court,
though complicated, are not more complicated than factors relating
to the death penalty. Furthermore, the "costs" of a jury requirement
in certain transfer decisions, if any actually exist, should not
outweigh the importance of the event to the juvenile.
3. Juries in Transfer Proceedings Do Not Impair the Unique
Function of Juvenile Courts
Since the formation of the juvenile court system, its supporters
have argued that it is meant to be different. The Supreme Court
has considered this argument in each of its decisions concerning
whether to add procedural rights to juvenile adjudications and
transfer proceedings.222 In most cases, the Court has concluded that
adding procedural rights would not irreparably harm the juvenile
219. Any argument supporting an extension of the Apprendi jury guarantee to juvenile
adjudications, which effectively would overturn the McKeiver plurality decision, is beyond
the scope of this Note. This Note argues only that the rule should apply to certain juvenile
transfer proceedings.
220. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 498 (Scalia, J., concurring).
221. See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 607 (2002).
222. See Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 535-39 (1975); McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 547 (plurality
opinion); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 366-67 (1970); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1967);
Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 562 (1966).
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court system.223 In McKeiver, of course, the Court argued that the
"unique" nature of the juvenile court would be damaged by adding
a jury requirement.224 Some recent state and federal court decisions,
relying on the McKeiver opinion, have concluded that a jury
requirement similarly would impair the function of transfer
proceedings. 225 Other due process guarantees, the courts have
argued, are sufficient to protect the juvenile from any procedural
deficiencies in the transfer process.226
Again, the juvenile transfer process is only one aspect of the
juvenile court system, and a recent addition at that. The McKeiver
opinion focused entirely on juvenile adjudications, not transfer
proceedings. Certainly, one may argue that imposing a jury
requirement for juvenile adjudications could impose substantial
burdens on the juvenile court system, to the point that the system
may lose its unique function. 27 Imposing a jury requirement only
on certain juvenile transfer decisions, however, would not have the
same negative impact. Transfer proceedings, as indicated earlier,
deal as much with the criminal court system as they do with the
juvenile court system.22' The McKeiver plurality opinion, therefore,
would have a lesser impact on these proceedings than on the
juvenile adjudications to which the decision was meant to apply.
One may even argue that juvenile transfer proceedings already
impair the unique function of juvenile courts. The original juvenile
court system was meant to isolate all juveniles from the criminal
court system. It was meant to rehabilitate, or at least attempt to
rehabilitate, all juveniles, regardless of their age or the offense with
which they were charged. Today, all states mandate that certain
juveniles should be exempt from the protections of the juvenile
court system.229 In doing so, they have implied that modern society
223. See Breed, 421 U.S. at 535-39; Winship, 397 U.S. at 366-67; Gault, 387 U.S. at 27-28;
Kent, 383 U.S. at 562.
224. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 547.
225. See People v. Beltran, 765 N.E.2d 1071, 1075-76 (Ill. 2002); State v. Jones, 47 P.3d
783, 795-96 (Kan. 2002).
226. See Beltran, 765 N.E.2d at 1076; Jones, 47 P.3d at 796.
227. This Note does not argue that a jury should be required for juvenile adjudications.
See supra note 219.
228. After all, transfer proceedings were instituted to connect the once separate systems.
See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
229. See supra Part II.B.
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cannot afford to rehabilitate all juvenile offenders; some juveniles
instead must be treated as adults. This much certainly could be
true.230 If a state can allow certain juveniles to be treated as adults,
however, it cannot deny procedural rights in transfer proceedings
on the argument that the juvenile court is meant to be isolated,
independent, or different from the criminal court. This argument
may be justified for juvenile adjudications; those proceedings were
meant to be "unique" from their inception, and in a way still are.
The same cannot be said for juvenile transfer proceedings.
4. Amenability Findings Need Not Be Eliminated
A slim majority of judicial waiver statutes contain two compo-
nents; the remainder contain only the second component. In
twenty-seven states, the judge first must make a factual finding
about culpability, usually having to satisfy only a probable cause or
preponderance standard of certainty. 231 Afterward, the judge must
consider a number of amenability factors in determining whether
a juvenile could or should be rehabilitated in juvenile court.232 If he
could not or should not be rehabilitated, the juvenile shall be
transferred to criminal court.
in State v. Gonzales, the New Mexico Supreme Court focused on
whether, under Apprendi, a jury must find the amenability factors
beyond a reasonable doubt. The court concluded that amenability
factors were not the same as elements of a crime, and therefore the
rule in Apprendi did not apply.233 The court added that a jury,
which lacks the expertise of a juvenile court judge, is incapable of
determining which future treatments are appropriate for a
particular juvenile.234
Although amenability findings are not identical in form to
elements of a crime, they may have the effect of sending a juvenile
to criminal court. Some amenability hearings even presume that a
230. Any discussion of whether transfer statutes violate due process, other than as it
relates to the Apprendi decision, is beyond the scope of this Note.
231. See supra notes 102-03 and accompanying text. The remaining eighteen states that
have imposed judicial waiver statutes do not expressly require a finding of fact. See supra
note 101 for a comprehensive list of judicial waiver statutes.
232. See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556-57 (1966).
233. See State v. Gonzales, 24 P.3d 776, 783-84 (N.M. 2001).
234. See id. at 784.
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juvenile shall be transferred. 3 In other cases, amenability factors,
if found to exist, would prescribe that the judge keep the individual
in the juvenile court system.2 36 Only some amenability factors,
therefore, would enhance a juvenile's potential sentence. Only
those factors possibly could fall under Apprendi's rule. The
Supreme Court in Apprendi was not concerned with factors that, if
found to exist, would only mitigate a defendant's sentence.37 A
judge, therefore, could determine those mitigating factors even if
the Apprendi rule applied.
It is true that amenability findings predict a juvenile's future
conduct, rather than determine his past conduct.23' The Supreme
Court, however, has questioned a judge's "superior" authority in
making such complex determinations in other types of sen-
tencing.239 Indeed, the thirty-five states that have enacted legisla-
tive and prosecutorial waiver statutes already have decided that a
state legislature or a charging prosecutor is as qualified as a judge
to determine which individuals are not fit for treatment in juvenile
court. Surely a group of jurors, who in a criminal trial would be
qualified to determine one's motive, bias, or credibility, are just-as
qualified to consider one's propensity for rehabilitation.
At any rate, amenability findings are only one part of the
determination that must be made under the judicial waiver
statutes. In legislative waiver and prosecutorial waiver situations,
a juvenile's amenability is not a required determination at all. The
presence of a jury, therefore, would not have a significant effect on
the transfer process for this reason alone.
235. For example, the Minnesota judicial waiver statute mandates that, in most
circumstances, the juvenile shall be transferred to criminal court unless the judge finds by
"clear and convincing evidence" that public safety would be served by keeping the young
defendant in the juvenile system. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260B.125 (West 2003).
236. The Minnesota statute, which does impose a presumption of waiver under certain
circumstances, allows a judge to rebut this presumption upon finding that the existence of
certain factors-such as seriousness of the alleged offense, the juvenile's level of participation
in committing the offense, the juvenile's prior record and responsiveness to past treatment,
and the adequacy of the dispositional options available in the juvenile court system-indicate
that "public safety" would be served by keeping the individual in the juvenile court system.
Id.
237. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 n.16, 494 & n.19 (2000).
238. See Gonzales, 24 P.3d at 784.
239. See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 607 (2002).
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B. Policy Arguments Favoring a Jury Requirement
Undoubtedly, the ideal juvenile court system has not been
realized. No longer are all juveniles regarded as "vulnerable, fragile,
and dependent innocents."2 4' The enactment of transfer statutes by
every state legislature reflects this transition in popular opinion.
Although judicial waiver statutes leave a moderate amount of
discretion to the judge over whether to authorize the transfer,
legislative waiver statutes leave no discretion at all. Prosecutorial
waiver statutes, meanwhile, leave absolute discretion to the
charging prosecutor, who may authorize a transfer for any reason.
None of these systems is perfect. Although some states have
attempted to minimize these imperfections-such as through
reverse waiver statutes-no absolute safeguard exists. Indeed, in
the states that have enacted termination statutes, the imperfections
of the transfer process cannot be rectified once a juvenile has been
transferred, tried in criminal court, and convicted.
Having a jury determine the facts necessary to transfer a juvenile
to criminal court will not eliminate all the imperfections of the
transfer proceeding. No aspect of the criminal process, after all, is
flawless. A jury requirement, however, will hold a transfer proceed-
ing to the same standard as the criminal trial to which the juvenile
would be transferred. In setting the same high standard, a jury
requirement will bring with it additional policy benefits.24'
A jury trial, for example, will help to involve the community in
the disposition of juvenile offenders. The recent changes in the
juvenile court system reflect in part a societal unease in the way it
was being run.2 42 Entrusting some juvenile waiver decisions to
representatives of the community could inspire public confidence in
the system. Some court opinions have suggested that the jury's lack
240. Feld, supra note 22, at 1136-37.
241. The policy arguments discussed in the remainder of this section are only illustrative,
because this Note's central argument concerns the legal applicability of Apprendi v. New
Jersey to juvenile transfers. As predicting the actual impact of Apprendi's application is
difficult, if not impossible, one certainly might question the validity of these policy
arguments. The potential impact alone, however, does not in any way affect the validity of
this Note's central argument.
242. See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
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of experience in juvenile matters would be a liability.243 Yet, not
only has the Supreme Court recently cast doubt on that assump-
tion,244 but the jury's "lack of experience," as it were, has an added
advantage. Members of a jury, who unlike judges do not render
judgment in criminal matters on a nearly daily basis, likely would
exercise greater caution in making their decision.245 This cautious
approach would help to prevent what have been described as the
unavoidable "inequities and disparities" of the judicial transfer
process.246
The outcome of almost all Supreme Court decisions in this area
has been the extension of procedural rights to juvenile proceedings;
McKeiver was an exception to the rule. These decisions all have
indicated that such extensions would not disrupt the unique nature
of the juvenile court system. Imposing a jury requirement on certain
transfer proceedings will not seriously disrupt the system, either.
In fact, it ultimately might create a more efficient system. A jury
that considers the facts more carefully than a judge who makes
such findings every day could more effectively weed out the
juveniles who truly should be treated as adults. The presence of
several jurors in the transfer proceeding also could more impres-
sively signal the gravity of the situation to an individual who is in
danger of losing his juvenile status.247
C. How the Jury Requirement Could Safely Apply
As this Note has argued, juvenile transfer decisions should not be
exempt from Apprendi's jury requirement. Other than the fact of a
prior conviction, any unstipulated factual findings needed to
enhance a juvenile's sentence, such that he could be tried in
juvenile court but instead will be tried in criminal court, should be
243. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528,551 (1971) (White, J., concurring); State
v. Gonzales, 24 P.3d 776, 784 (N.M. 2001).
244. See Ring 536 U.S. at 607.
245. See McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 565-66, 568-69 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
246. See Feld, supra note 8, at 704-05. Inconsistent court decisions and evidence of
"arbitrary, capricious, and discriminatory" judicial decisions indicate that the same transfer
hearing might be decided differently depending on the particular jurisdiction in which it
takes place, or even the particular judge presiding over the hearing. See id. at 704.
247. See McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 563-64 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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determined by a jury.2 41 What is left to determine is how this rule
would affect the existing transfer statutes. The statutes may be
revised in a way that incorporates the Apprendi rule without
destroying the function either of the transfer process or the juvenile
court system in general. This Note now will explain exactly how
this may be accomplished.
1. Judicial Waiver
Judicial waiver statutes mandate that a judge, under certain
circumstances, must decide whether a juvenile meets the prerequi-
sites for transfer, or instead is amenable to treatment in juvenile
court.2 49 These statutes may be modified to incorporate the jury
requirement in the same way as any other sentencing practice
falling under Apprendi's influence. First, the statutes should be
revised to require that a jury make any preliminary factual finding
that a given statute may mandate. The jury should find the
necessary facts beyond a reasonable doubt. One might argue that
requiring a reasonable doubt standard contradicts the Supreme
Court's holding in Breed v. Jones.25 ° Having a jury decide the facts
that would transfer a juvenile to criminal court, only to have a
second jury decide the facts necessary to convict the juvenile in the
eventual trial, might fall too close to a Double Jeopardy violation.
This argument is not sufficient to justify a denial of the jury re-
quirement, however. If the juvenile's substantial interest in a jury
requirement were weighed against the potential burden he might
suffer by appearing before two separate juries, surely the benefit
would outweigh the burden. In addition, the jury making the
transfer determination would consider different factors than the
jury making the determination of guilt. The first jury would be
more concerned with the juvenile's chances for rehabilitation than
with the details of the offense itself, other than what it shows of
248. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). Any argument favoring or
opposing the inclusion of prior juvenile adjudications as "prior convictions" is beyond the
scope of this Note. But see supra notes 162-68 and accompanying text for a brief overview
of this issue.
249. See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text. As discussed earlier, a slim majority
of states also require that the judge make a limited factual finding. See supra notes 102-03
and accompanying text.
250. 421 U.S. 519 (1975).
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the juvenile's character. 25 ' The second jury, meanwhile, would
decide de novo only whether the facts themselves support a
conviction in criminal court.
As discussed before, not all amenability findings necessarily
require a jury under Apprendi. Amenability factors that serve to
keep an individual in the juvenile court system do not violate
Apprendi even if a judge, rather than a jury, finds that they exist.
Such factors do not enhance a juvenile's sentence beyond the
statutory maximum afforded by the juvenile court system. Only
factors that would mandate or authorize the judge to transfer the
juvenile to the criminal court system are subject to Apprendi. An
individual state could resolve this conflict in one of two ways. If it
wishes, it simply could allow juries to make all amenability
findings. As explained before, juries are not necessarily inferior
determiners of a juvenile's amenability to rehabilitation.252 In some
ways, in fact, they may be superior to judges." 3
If a state does not believe this to be the case, it still may revise its
statute in a way that satisfies the jury requirement but does not
eliminate the amenability hearing entirely. The statute could
impose a presumption of transfer once the preliminary factual
finding, if any, has been satisfied. Any amenability findings would
serve to rebut this presumption. In other words, only factors that
indicate a juvenile may be amenable to treatment in juvenile court
would be considered. Absent these factors, a juvenile automatically
may be transferred to criminal court after a jury makes any
preliminary factual finding that may be required. Because the
factors only would serve to keep an individual in juvenile court,
rather than enhance his potential sentence by sending him to
criminal court, a judge may make this determination without
violating Apprendi.5 4
251. See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text; cf. Breed, 421 U.S. at 535-36
(suggesting that transfer decisions violate the Double Jeopardy Clause only when they
reproduce the adjudication process).
252. See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 607 (2002); McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S.
528, 565-66, 568-69 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
253. See McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 565-66, 568-69 (Douglas, J., dissenting). For a general
discussion of the jury's ability to consider issues of amenability, see supra Part IV.A.4.
254. See supra Part IV.A.4.
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2. Legislative Waiver
Legislative waiver statutes provide that when a juvenile, usually
of a certain minimum age, is charged with certain serious offenses,
that juvenile automatically will be sent to criminal court.2 5 5 The
effect of such statutes, unlike judicial waiver and prosecutorial
waiver statutes, is that the juvenile never faces the possibility of
treatment in juvenile court. For this reason, legislative waiver
statutes do not violate Apprendi.
Certainly, powerful arguments against this type of statute
abound. Many commentators have pointed out that the automatic
nature of legislative waiver, which provides absolutely no room for
discretion, violates the juvenile's due process rights.2" This may be
so; however, one right that it does not violate is the right espoused
in the Apprendi decision. Legislative waiver is not a matter of
determining whether a given fact is a sentencing factor or an
element of a crime. The juvenile is not left in the dark as to whether
he will be sent to criminal court.257 If he commits a certain offense,
and he is of a certain age, he will be sent to criminal court. His
potential sentence was not enhanced by being tried in criminal
court, for the only applicable sentencing range from the beginning
was that which applies to criminal defendants. Apprendi, therefore,
does not affect the constitutionality of these statutes.
3. Prosecutorial Waiver
Like legislative waiver statutes, prosecutorial waiver statutes
give prosecutors authority to send certain juveniles to the criminal
court system without having to make any formal factual or
amenability determinations. The difference, however, is that the
juvenile's fate ultimately lies in the prosecutor's discretion.25 Until
the prosecutor makes his decision, the juvenile is left in the dark as
to whether he will be adjudicated in juvenile court or tried as an
adult in criminal court.
259
255. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
256. See supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text.
257. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 498 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring).
258. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
259. Cf. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 498 (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that the criminal who
receives a greater sentence "than he bargained for when he did the crime" was treated
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Other critical differences exist between prosecutorial waiver and
legislative waiver statutes. Prosecutorial waiver decisions are
especially subject to unfairness, political bias, and overcharging.2 60
Indeed, prosecutorial waiver statutes already impose fewer
procedural limits on the charging prosecutors than judicial waiver
statutes place on juvenile court judges.26' If judicial waiver deci-
sions, in their present form, do not meet Apprendi standards, surely
prosecutorial waiver decisions do not either.
Apprendi, of course, dealt only with judge-made decisions. Its
holding, however, did not specify which entities may not make
sentence enhancement decisions. It required, rather, that one
particular entity-the jury-make all such decisions. Apprendi's
applicability, therefore, is not affected if a prosecutor, rather than
a judge, makes the transfer decision.
No easy way exists to remedy the prosecutorial waiver statutes,
other than the method suggested in Commonwealth v. Quincy Q:
before a trial may commence, a jury must determine whether the
prosecutor's decision to charge the juvenile in criminal court was
appropriate.262 That requirement, of course, would almost defeat the
very purpose of prosecutorial waiver.26 ' The best solution simply
may be to abolish such statutes entirely. The various states could
replace them with judicial waiver or legislative waiver statutes,
or both. This would not pose a serious administrative problem.
Of the twelve states that currently have prosecutorial waiver
statutes, only two do not already have judicial or legislative waiver
statutes.264
4. Post-waiver Statutes
Neither reverse waiver nor termination statutes seem to be af-
fected by the Apprendi rule. Reverse waiver statutes serve to send
unfairly if a jury did not decide all the facts that increased the sentence).
260. See supra notes 114-15 and accompanying text.
261. See supra Part II.B.3.
262. See 753 N.E.2d 781, 789-90 (Mass. 2001), abrogated on other grounds by
Commonwealth v. King, 834 N.E.2d 1175, 1198-201 & 1201 n.28 (Mass. 2005).
263. Prosecutorial waiver statutes, in a sense, serve to speed up the adjudication process
by bypassing the relative formality of a judicial hearing. See supra Part II.B.3.
264. See MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 119, § 54 (West 2003); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 43-261
(LexisNexis 1998). Of these two states, Massachusetts already has imposed a jury
requirement. See Quincy Q., 753 N.E.2d at 789-90.
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an individual who currently falls under criminal court jurisdiction
back to the juvenile court system. Any factual or amenability
determinations such statutes authorize could not possibly violate
Apprendi, as they would not enhance the juvenile's potential
sentence. If anything, they only would mitigate it. Termination
statutes, meanwhile, are similar to legislative waiver statutes in
that they mandate that certain juveniles shall be tried in criminal
court. Such juveniles know for certain that, by being tried and
convicted of certain offenses in criminal court, they shall be tried in
criminal court for any subsequent offenses." 5 For the same reasons
that legislative waiver statutes remain unaffected by Apprendi,266
therefore, so do termination statutes.
CONCLUSION
Few people would argue that the juvenile court system has lived
up to the ideals of the Progressive movement. Until these ideals are
met, the best alternative is for courts to continue to consider and
modify the procedural rights applicable to juvenile proceedings. The
U.S. Supreme Court has done just that since In re Gault.
This Note does not rebut the juvenile transfer process in its
entirety. It merely makes an argument about which rights should
be granted for such proceedings. The procedures of these proceed-
ings cannot remain firmly in place while the law's ever-changing
view of sentencing practices moves forward. Apprendi v. New Jersey
reflects this movement. In order to maintain its proper function,
juvenile transfer proceedings must be subject to this movement. A
guarantee that a jury will make the necessary findings is but a
minor burden to place on a decision to subject a juvenile to the trial
and punishment of an adult. Indeed, given the Supreme Court's
recent holding in Apprendi, it is an essential right that should be
afforded all juveniles facing that possibility.
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